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The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law
By David Skeel*
In less than a decade, Delaware’s legislature has overruled its courts and reshaped
Delaware corporate law on two different occasions: with proxy access bylaws in 2009
and with shareholder litigation bylaws in 2015. Having two dramatic interventions in
quick succession would be puzzling under any circumstances. The interventions are even
more puzzling because with proxy access, Delaware’s legislature authorized the use of by-
laws or charter provisions that Delaware’s courts had banned, and with shareholder liti-
gation, it banned bylaws or charter provisions that the courts had authorized. This article
attempts to unravel the puzzle.
Starting with corporate law doctrine, I find that a doctrinal account has more explan-
atory power than one might initially expect. In particular, Delaware’s courts appear to be
zealous in protecting the discretion of corporate managers and directors, whereas the leg-
islature on each occasion intervened to revitalize shareholder protections. But this distinc-
tion leaves a variety of questions unanswered, such as the rapidity of the legislature’s
response and its use of a default rule with proxy access, as compared to a mandatory
shareholder litigation rule. To more fully explain the interventions, we need to consider
several other factors, including the importance of protecting the credibility of Delaware’s
judges. The credibility concern suggests that legislative thunderbolts are unlikely to become
routine because routine legislative intervention would undercut the authority of Delaware’s
judiciary.
INTRODUCTION
Delaware’s status as the leading state of incorporation for publicly held corpora-
tions is so well established that the four-decade debate over charter competition—
that is, states’ efforts to attract publicly held corporations—is widely thought to be
settled. According to the standard cliché, well known to the students of most cor-
porations classes, charter competition is over, and Delaware has won.1
* S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to
Margaret Blair, Bill Bratton, Seth Chertok, Paul Edelman, Luca Enriques, Eilis Ferran, Jill Fisch,
Larry Hamermesh, David Marcus, Ed Rock, Randall Thomas, Marco Ventoruzzo, and participants
at the 60th anniversary Conference of the Rivista delle Societa and at a workshop at Vanderbilt
Law School for helpful comments and conversations, and to Cole DuMond, Max Linder, and Bill
Seidleck for excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 679 (2002) (asserting that Delaware enjoys monopoly status and exploring the implications of
Delaware’s market power).
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Delaware does indeed have a dominant position in corporate law. Roughly
60 percent of the largest corporations are incorporated in Delaware, and more
than 80 percent of corporations that choose a state of incorporation outside
their home state choose Delaware.2 Yet Delaware’s preeminence does not
mean that its law is static or that the state is insulated from outside challenges.
The past fifteen years have brought two unexpected jolts to the corporate ecosys-
tem, each of which has prompted surprising shifts in Delaware corporate law.
The first is a marked expansion of federal regulation of corporate law and an
accompanying shrinkage of the portion of corporate law that is regulated by Del-
aware and other states. Since the 1930s, when Congress enacted the Securities
Act of 19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 corporate law, which,
traditionally was regulated almost entirely by the states, has included an overlay
of federal securities law. After a long period of relative quiescence, Congress has
sharply expanded the federal component of corporate regulation on two differ-
ent occasions in the new century. In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which, among other things, banned loans to corporate directors and officers
and imposed new internal controls requirements.5 After the 2008 financial crisis,
Congress further federalized state corporate law with the Dodd-Frank Act.6 The
Dodd-Frank Act imposed a new “say on pay” voting requirement7 and, of par-
ticular note for this article, authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) to promulgate rules providing for proxy access—that is, rules that give
shareholders the right to include their nominations for the board of directors in
the company’s own proxy materials.8
The second shift is even more recent. In the past decade, the shareholders of
Delaware corporations have brought an increasing number and percentage of
their lawsuits against corporate directors or officers in states other than Dela-
ware. According to one prominent study, Delaware’s share of corporate litigation
was 60 percent through 2001, but dropped to 40 percent or less from 2002 on.9
Sometimes shareholders forsake Delaware altogether. More often, one group of
shareholders files a lawsuit in Delaware, whereas others file lawsuits in other
states based on the same alleged misconduct, a phenomenon that has become
2. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 567–68, 578 tbls. 2, 5 (2002).
3. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012 &
Supp. 2016)).
4. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk (2012
& Supp. 2016)).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act]; id. § 402, 116 Stat. at 787–88 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012 & Supp. III 2015)) (ban on loans); id. § 404, 116 Stat. at 789
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)) (internal controls).
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
7. Id. § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
8. Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)).
9. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 605, 621 (2012).
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known as multi-forum litigation. Multi-forum cases require judges to coordinate
with their peers elsewhere to determine, among other things, whether and where
to consolidate the cases.
Each development made its way to Delaware in the same curious way: as a
controversy over the kinds of bylaw provisions a corporation can include in
its foundational documents.10 Between the first and second congressional inter-
vention, shareholders of a Delaware corporation sought to adopt a bylaw that
would require the corporation to reimburse the expenses of shareholders who
had successfully placed their nominees on the board of directors.11 During
the more recent tussle over multi-forum litigation, firms started adopting clauses
that were designed to restrict shareholder litigation by requiring that lawsuits be
filed in a particular state—such as Delaware—or by imposing a “loser pays” rule
for attorney’s fees, which would reverse the usual American rule that plaintiffs
are never required to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees.12
It is curious but perhaps unsurprising that corporate bylaws emerged as the
key battleground in Delaware. Although bylaws did not figure prominently in
corporate governance battles until recently,13 Delaware seems to give the parties
broad flexibility to adopt bylaws on nearly any subject they wish. Under Dela-
ware’s corporate law statute, “[t]he bylaws may contain any provision, not incon-
sistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business
of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights
or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”14 Given this flex-
ibility, bylaw innovations were an obvious way for parties affected by the two
major corporate law developments of the past decade to take advantage of, or
defend against, the changing corporate landscape.15
Although the centrality of bylaws was perhaps to be expected, Delaware’s re-
sponse to the handling of the controversies that ensued was far more surprising.
10. A corporation’s bylaws are its general operating rules. They often include provisions such as
the rules for calling a special meeting or the number of directors on the corporation’s board. A cor-
poration also can put any of these provisions, including those discussed in this article, in its certificate
of incorporation (“charter”) if both the directors and the shareholders approve the new charter
provision.
11. These developments are described in detail in infra Part I.
12. These developments are described in detail in infra Part I. A smaller number of corporations
adopted arbitration clauses that require shareholders to arbitrate any complaints, rather than litigat-
ing in court.
13. Shareholders began invoking their right to amend the corporation’s bylaws in proxy contests
waged in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). In
the 1990s, shareholder activists devised and sought shareholder approval of bylaws that would re-
quire shareholder approval before directors could put a poison-pill takeover defense in place. Al-
though the Delaware courts never explicitly ruled on the question of whether poison-pill bylaws
are permissible bylaws, a number of leading Delaware commentators concluded that they are not.
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking
Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998) (arguing that the bylaws impermissibly interfere with di-
rectorial discretion). The battle over these poison-pill bylaws foreshadowed the controversies I dis-
cuss in this article.
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015).
15. Jill Fisch calls these and related developments “the new governance.” Jill E. Fisch, The New
Governance, 81 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (Pomerantz Lecture).
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The Delaware courts struck down the first set of bylaws—proxy access16—but
upheld the second—shareholder litigation.17 This divergence of outcomes is
mildly puzzling by itself, but the outcomes get even more puzzling when we
consider the response of Delaware lawmakers. The Delaware legislature over-
ruled its courts each time. Whereas Delaware’s courts struck down the proxy ac-
cess bylaws and upheld restrictions on shareholder litigation, the Delaware leg-
islature did precisely the opposite, authorizing proxy access18 and clamping
down on shareholder litigation bylaws.19
My objective in this article is to try to make sense of these two puzzles: the
small puzzle of the Delaware courts’ divergent treatment of the two sets of bylaws
and the larger puzzle of the Delaware legislature’s decision to promptly overrule
its courts in both contexts.
The effort to explain Delaware’s handling of the bylaw issues will lead me to
two issues that have largely been neglected by the existing literature on charter
competition and Delaware’s status as the preeminent state of incorporation. The
first is the credibility of Delaware’s judges—and more to the point, potential
threats to the credibility of Delaware’s judiciary. Second is the question of
when and why Delaware’s legislature intervenes to redirect the course of Dela-
ware corporate law, rather than leaving its development to the common law pro-
cess. I believe that these factors are an increasingly important part of the Dela-
ware corporate law story.
Part I of the article describes the two sets of bylaws and the response to each
by the Delaware courts and lawmakers in more detail. Part II considers a doc-
trinal account of the courts’ and legislature’s actions. Although the doctrinal
analysis is more helpful than one might initially expect, it only partially explains
the divergent responses of Delaware’s courts and legislature. This suggests that
additional imperatives may have played a role. Parts III and IV incorporate judi-
cial credibility into a public-choice explanation of the imperatives, such as Del-
aware’s interest in minimizing federal intrusion in state corporate law, which
may have influenced the Delaware legislature. Part V introduces and offers initial
thoughts on the question of when Delaware’s legislature is likely to redirect the
course of Delaware corporate law, as it did with both sets of bylaws.
I. A TALE OF TWO (SETS OF) BYLAWS
The two most dramatic corporate law changes of the past fifteen years have
been the increasing federal role in corporate law and the advent of multi-forum
litigation. Delaware’s principal role in each context has been to determine
16. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008) (finding that a
proxy access bylaw was invalid).
17. See ATP Tours, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014) (finding that a loser-
pays bylaw was permissible).
18. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
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whether bylaws relating to the issue in question are permissible under Dela-
ware law.
The capacity to alter a corporation’s operating rules by amending or adding
a bylaw has been one of the key powers of corporate directors for the past
century.20 Like directors, shareholders have the power to unilaterally alter the
bylaws21—it is one of the few direct powers shareholders have—and in the
past several decades, shareholders have increasingly made use of their authority.
Bylaw-based strategies appear to have been an innovation borne of necessity.
Delaware’s validation of poison-pill takeover defenses in the mid-1980s,22 to-
gether with its case law on the fiduciary duties of target directors, made it diffi-
cult for bidders to make bids for target corporations whose directors were resis-
tant to the acquisition.23 As an alternative, bidders began waging proxy contests
designed to replace a majority of the target board with directors more sympa-
thetic to the bidder.24 Bylaw amendments were a key feature of many of these
contests. The bidder might propose to increase the size of the corporation’s
board, for instance, and to fill the new slots with bidder-friendly directors.25
When a new issue arises, bylaws are now an obvious place for both directors
and shareholders to look for a potential solution.
The discussion that follows provides a brief overview of the two recent disrup-
tions of state corporate law and of Delaware’s handling of the bylaw battles that
arose in each context.
A. THE ADVENT OF PROXY ACCESS BYLAWS
In 2002, Congress hastily enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the
corporate scandals of 2001–2002.26 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added a variety
of corporate governance rules to the securities laws, including a requirement
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2015). Section 109(a) does not directly authorize directors to
alter the corporation’s bylaws. Rather, it permits the corporation to provide such authority in its cer-
tificate of incorporation. The certificates of publicly held corporations almost always give directors
this power. Interestingly, directors originally did not have bylaw authority—only shareholders did.
The states’ decision to give directors this power was initially controversial in some circles. See Hamer-
mesh, supra note 13, at 450 (citing a 1908 critique by Arthur Machen, a leading corporate law au-
thority of the time).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a). Whereas directors only have bylaw authority if the certificate
provides for it, section 109(a) directly authorizes shareholders to amend the bylaws and forbids the
corporation from taking this authority away.
22. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
23. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
24. The story of bidders’ shift from tender offers to proxy contests has often been told. See, e.g.,
Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (discussing the advent of “dead hand”
poison pills as a strategy for thwarting proxy contests and invalidating the dead hand pill in that
case).
25. Examples of this strategy, and of directors’ use of their own bylaw changes to try to thwart
shareholder action, include the following: Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (adopting heightened scrutiny of actions designed to interfere with shareholder voting);
Liquid Audio v. MM Co., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (adopting and reshaping Blasius standard).
26. See supra note 5.
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that publicly held corporations create an audit committee consisting entirely of
independent directors, a prohibition on loans to managers and directors, and a
requirement that the firm establish a system of internal controls.27 However, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not address the question of whether shareholders should
be permitted to include their nominees in the company’s proxy materials. Proxy
access quickly emerged as the central corporate governance issue of the imme-
diate post-crisis period—the principal piece of unfinished business.28 The lead-
ing advocates for proxy reform included several prominent public pension funds
and a variety of other shareholder groups.29 The Business Roundtable and other
manager-oriented groups resisted, insisting that proxy access would unnecessar-
ily complicate the proxy process and would be used to strengthen the leverage of
unions rather than to enhance corporate governance.30 Somewhat surprisingly,
perhaps due to fading memories of the earlier scandals, the critics prevailed at
the SEC. The SEC left the proxy rules intact, and it interpreted the rules as ex-
cluding proposals that might seek to provide for proxy access.31
Having failed at the SEC, shareholders tried another tack. After the SEC as-
sured AIG that it could exclude a proxy access bylaw that had been proposed
by AFSCME, the largest public employee union, AFSCME appealed, challenging
the SEC’s interpretation of its own rules. Under the shareholder proposal rule in
place at the time, a corporation could exclude proposals “relating to an election.”
AFSCME acknowledged that a proposal to include a particular slate of directorial
nominees in a company’s proxy materials would “relat[e] to an election” but ar-
gued that its proposal advocating for a set of election procedures would not. In
AFSCME v. AIG, the Second Circuit agreed, holding that AIG could not exclude
the proposal.32 A limited form of proxy access had prevailed.
Rather than accepting the Second Circuit’s ruling, the SEC quickly revised its
rule. The new rule explicitly stated that a corporation could exclude proposals
related to “a procedure for . . . nomination or election” from its proxy materi-
als.33 The language now left no doubt that proxy access proposals could be
excluded.
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 5, § 301, 116 Stat. at 775–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1 (2012)) (independent audit committee); id. § 402, 116 Stat. at 787–88 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012 & Supp. III 2015)) (ban on loans); id. § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)) (internal controls).
28. The prehistory of the recent proxy access debate dates back to 1942, when the SEC first pro-
mulgated its proxy rules. Shareholder advocates proposed that shareholder nominations be included
in the company proxy materials as a matter of course, but managers persuaded the SEC to permit
exclusion of election-related proposals. For the history, see Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Re-
constructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS.
LAW. 329, 329–60 (2010) (surveying support for proxy access).
30. See, e.g., Judith Bums, CEOs Blast SEC Proxy Plan, While Unions Praise It, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
(Oct. 8, 2003).
31. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and
in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012).
32. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Emps. Pension Plan v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d
121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2008).
6 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 72, Winter 2016–2017
The next round of the debate shifted from the SEC to Congress. When Con-
gress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act after the 2008 financial crisis, it explicitly au-
thorized the SEC to put a proxy access rule in place.34 By this time, the SEC had
been chastened by a barrage of criticism regarding its perceived regulatory fail-
ures during the bubble period prior to the crisis, and the SEC had begun to reg-
ulate more vigorously under Chair Mary Schapiro. In August 2010, shortly after
the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the SEC promulgated a proxy access rule au-
thorizing shareholders who had held at least 3 percent of a company’s stock for
three years to include directorial candidates in the company’s proxy materials.35
The new proxy access rule never went into effect. The Business Roundtable
immediately challenged the rule, arguing, among other things, that the rule
had not been properly adopted. The D.C. Circuit agreed.36 In a dismissive opin-
ion written by Judge Ginsburg, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC had failed to
conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis of the effects of the rule. In Judge
Ginsburg’s view, “the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed
the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain
costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support
its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial
problems raised by commenters.”37
Delaware’s entry into the proxy access controversy came after the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. In early 2008, share-
holders of a Delaware corporation, CA, Inc., proposed a bylaw that would re-
quire the company to reimburse the expenses of shareholders who waged suc-
cessful proxy contests. The directors argued that the proposed bylaw would
be illegal under Delaware law and asked the SEC for a no-action letter stating
that the SEC would not challenge CA, Inc. if the company excluded the proposal
from its proxy materials.38 In a 2008 ruling responding to certified questions
from the SEC, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the directors.39 The
court concluded that the proxy expense bylaw was not permissible because it
could interfere with directors’ discretion.40
A year later, in 2009, the Delaware legislature overruled the decision by stat-
ute. Delaware enacted a package of two proxy access provisions: one authorizing
bylaws providing for proxy access and the other inviting bylaws for the reim-
bursement of proxy expenses.41
34. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 6, § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n (2012)).
35. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9136, 99 S.E.C.
Docket 439 (Nov. 15, 2010). The SEC also altered 14a-8(i) to make clear that proxy access bylaw
proposals could not be excluded from the company’s proxy materials. Id.
36. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
37. Id. at 1148–49.
38. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008).
39. Id. at 239–40.
40. Id.
41. See 77 Del. Laws, c. 14, §§ 1, 2 (2009) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112,
113 (2009)).
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In one key respect, Delaware’s proxy access rules are weaker than the rule that
the SEC promulgated two years later. Delaware’s default position is no proxy ac-
cess. Until a qualified majority of a corporation’s shareholders vote to approve a
proxy access bylaw (or the board of directors adds proxy access to the bylaws),
shareholders are not permitted to include any of their own nominees in the cor-
poration’s proxy materials. Under the SEC rule, proxy access was automatic for
shareholders who met the shareholding requirements.42 Because the SEC rule
was struck down, the Delaware provisions currently are the only source of
proxy access for Delaware corporations.43
B. THE END OF (MOST) SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION BYLAWS
The second upheaval in state corporate law—with its accompanying bylaw
drama—has unfolded even more recently. The more recent controversy was trig-
gered by a stunning increase in the frequency of shareholder challenges to pro-
posed merger transactions. A decade ago, shareholders challenged less than half
of all mergers involving companies with $500 million or more in assets.44 This
percentage has rapidly increased; since 2011, well over 90 percent of the merg-
ers have been challenged.45 Not only is nearly every merger challenged but most
also draw multiple lawsuits, often filed in multiple states. Multi-forum litigation
and the headache of coordinating overlapping lawsuits in different states is now
the norm after a major merger transaction is announced.
In a 2010 case involving Revlon Corporation, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis
Laster hinted that forum selection clauses—that is, clauses that require any liti-
gation to be filed in a particular state—would probably be legal under Dela-
ware law. “[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular
forum would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolu-
tion,” he wrote, “then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions
selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”46 This hint seems to
have inspired the boards of a number of Delaware corporations to adopt
forum selection bylaws.47 In 2013, then-Chancellor Leo Strine fielded the first
42. See Roe, supra note 31, at 14–15 (making similar point about the comparative weakness of the
Delaware provisions).
43. The securities laws do contribute in one significant respect. Although Rule 14a-11 was struck
down, the Business Roundtable case did not affect the SEC’s revision of Rule 14a-8, which was imple-
mented at the same time and no longer permits a corporation to exclude shareholder proposals to
adopt proxy access or proxy expense bylaws from the firm’s proxy materials. See Facilitating Share-
holder Director Nominations, supra note 35.
44. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition
and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015) (finding that 39.3 percent of transactions resulted in
litigation in 2005, but that by 2011, 92.1 percent were challenged).
45. Id.
46. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010). Vice Chancellor Laster
noted that one Delaware corporation (NetSuite, Inc.) had a forum selection provision in its charter
and another (Oracle) had one in its bylaws. Id. at 960 n.8.
47. See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder
Litigation 11 (NEBR Working Paper No. 21362, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2622595.
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challenge to the new forum selection bylaws. In Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement
Fund v. Chevron Corp.,48 the chancellor upheld the bylaws. Strine vigorously re-
jected the plaintiffs’ argument that forum selection bylaws are invalid unless they
are first approved by a shareholder vote. “In an unbroken line of decisions dating
back several generations,” he wrote, “our Supreme Court has made clear that the
bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware corporation
and its stockholders. Stockholders are on notice that . . . the board may act uni-
laterally to adopt bylaws.”49 Although the bylaw in Chevron required sharehold-
ers to file their lawsuits in Delaware, the Delaware Chancery Court subsequently
upheld a bylaw that selected another forum—North Carolina—as the forum of
choice, concluding that “nothing in the text or reasoning of Chevron can be said
to prohibit directors of a Delaware corporation from designating an exclusive
forum other than Delaware in its bylaws.”50
Less than a year after Chevron, the Delaware Supreme Court gave its imprimatur
to an even more dramatic shareholder litigation bylaw.51 The bylaw—which re-
quired any member of ATP Tour, Inc., the men’s professional tennis tour, to reim-
burse the firm’s fees, costs, and expenses if the member sues and “does not obtain a
judgment on the merits that substantially achieves . . . the full remedy sought”52—
came to the Delaware Supreme Court as a series of certified questions from the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware. Adopting the same contractual logic as
Chevron, the Delaware Supreme Court held that fee-shifting bylaws are facially
valid. “Because corporate bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,”
Justice Berger wrote, “a fee-shifting provision . . . would fall within the contractual
exception to the American Rule [which permits the parties to alter by contract the
ordinary rule that each party pays its own attorney’s fees]. Therefore, a fee-shifting
bylaw would not be prohibited under Delaware common law.”53
Once again, as with proxy access, the Delaware legislature quickly registered
its disapproval. This time, the legislature prohibited the new bylaws. Almost as
soon as the Delaware Supreme Court had endorsed loser-pays bylaws, the Cor-
poration Law Council54 proposed amendments that would forbid them.55 The
48. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
49. Id. at 956. Chancellor Strine pointedly rejected a contrary holding by the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, characterizing the decision as “rest[ing] on a failure to appre-
ciate the contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware corporations and their stock-
holders.” Id. (discussing Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
50. Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 235 (Del. Ch. 2014).
51. ATP Tours, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
52. Id. at 556.
53. Id. at 558.
54. The Corporation Law Council is a twenty-two-lawyer committee of the Delaware State Bar As-
sociation. The Council drafts recommended amendments to Delaware corporate law on an ongoing
basis. After approval by the corporation law section and the executive committee of the bar associ-
ation, Council amendments are forwarded to Delaware’s General Assembly for consideration. See
About the Section of Corporation Law, DEL. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.dsba.org/sections-committees/
sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
55. See Alison Frankel, Sneaky New Trend in IPOs: Make Shareholders Pay If They Sue and Lose, REU-
TERS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/10/09/sneaky-new-trend-in-ipos-
make-shareholders-pay-if-they-sue-and-lose/.
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initial proposal came a bit too quickly for the Delaware Senate, which asked the
Corporation Law Council to continue studying the issue so that it could be re-
visited in 2015.56
After the Council released its proposal,57 the reforms were introduced and
promptly enacted.58 The reforms included a pair of amendments barring a cor-
poration from including a loser-pays provision in either its certificate of incorpo-
ration or its bylaws.59 Delaware lawmakers also enacted a rather remarkable new
provision that allows forum selection clauses that select Delaware as the exclu-
sive location for shareholder litigation but does not permit a forum selection
bylaw to prevent shareholders from filing their lawsuit in Delaware.60 A Dela-
ware corporation that wishes to assure that any litigation will be brought in
one or a small number of states can therefore exclude every state except Delaware.
It is important to appreciate just how unusual Delaware’s recent legislative in-
terventions are. Although Delaware often updates its corporate law and is fa-
mously quick to adopt new corporate law innovations,61 the Delaware legislature
rarely steps in to reverse the course of Delaware corporate law. Prior to the bylaw
amendments, the last time lawmakers had dramatically redirected the course
of Delaware law was 1986, when the legislature disavowed the closely divided
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom62 by authorizing Del-
aware corporations to adopt charter provisions precluding monetary damages for
breach of the director’s duty of care.63
56. S.J. Res. 12, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014). The Chamber of Commerce and several major
corporations, including DuPont, had signaled their opposition to the proposed amendments, which
may have influenced the Delaware Senate’s decision to slow down the process. See, e.g., Francis G.X.
Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG.
BLOG (Mar. 6. 2015), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-
proposes-new-fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-legislation/.
57. See, e.g., Corp. Law Council, Explanation of Council Legislative Proposal (undated) (copy on
file with The Business Lawyer) (explaining and defending the proposed amendments).
58. The bill was introduced on April 29, 2015, enacted by the legislature on June 11, 2015, and
signed by the governor on June 24, 2015. See, e.g., Kevin La Croix, Delaware Legislature Passes Fee-
Shifting Bylaw Prohibition: What Questions Remain?, THE D&O DIARY (June 14, 2015), http://www.
dandodiary.com/2015/06/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/delaware-legislature-passes-fee-
shifting-bylaw-prohibition-what-questions-remain/; Jeff C. Dodd & James Edward Malony, Delaware
Passes Legislation Prohibiting Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Validating Exclusive Forum Bylaws for Stock Corpo-
rations, ANDREWS KURTH LLP (June 26, 2015), https://www.andrewskurth.com/insights-1230.html.
59. 80 Del. Laws, c. 40, §§ 1, 2 (2015) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b)
(2015)).
60. 80 Del. Laws, c. 40, § 5 (2015) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2015)). Section 115
overrules the chancery court’s endorsement of a non-Delaware exclusive forum provision in Provi-
dence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc. 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014). Section 115 also appears to in-
validate mandatory arbitration clauses, since these bylaws and charter provisions would remove lit-
igation in the Delaware courts as an option.
61. The classic study of Delaware lawmaking is Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of
the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1983). Romano found that Delaware was nearly
always one of the earliest adopters of an innovation.
62. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). For examples of other, less dramatic reversals by the
Delaware legislature of Delaware court rulings, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of
Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006).
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But the Delaware legislature has now stepped in twice in six years, once to
permit what was banned, and once to ban what was permitted. What in the
world is Delaware doing?
II. A DOCTRINAL EXPLANATION?
It is possible that an explanation can be found in Delaware doctrine. Sudden
shifts in the law sometimes reveal themselves, on more careful inspection, to
have arisen organically, as a logical outgrowth of existing doctrinal tendencies.64
Here, too, doctrine will carry us further than we might initially suspect.
The first puzzle for a doctrinal account of Delaware’s handling of the new by-
laws is explaining why one set of bylaws was permissible but the other was not.
The challenge is particularly acute given that the Delaware courts and Delaware
lawmakers drew opposite conclusions about the two sets of bylaws.
Let us start with the Delaware courts. Perhaps there is something about proxy
access that makes it inherently less appropriate than shareholder litigation rules
for inclusion in a corporation’s bylaws. But the logic that would lead to this con-
clusion is not obvious. Rules for directorial nominations—the focus of proxy
access—fit comfortably with the traditional understanding of bylaws as general
operating rules governing the relationships among directors, officers, and share-
holders.65 If anything, proxy access is a more, not less, suitable subject for by-
laws than shareholder litigation rules because shareholder litigation is, in a
sense, a breakdown of the company’s ordinary operating rules.
If we construe the holding in CA, Inc. narrowly—as being concerned with the
lack of nuance in the bylaw considered by the Delaware Supreme Court, rather
than ruling out proxy access bylaws altogether—the distinction is less jarring. In
this view, the problem was simply that the proposed proxy expense bylaw went
too far. The Delaware Supreme Court’s framing of the question before it arguably
supports this reading: “we must necessarily consider any possible circumstance
under which a board of directors might be required to act.”66 But the puzzle is
not solved. The bylaw that the Delaware Supreme Court approved in its loser-
pays decision was remarkably unnuanced. Read literally, it would force plaintiffs
to pay the directors’ expenses in nearly every case, because the bylaw calls for fee
64. The classic, though still contested, example is the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous “switch in
time” in 1937. Though the switch has long been attributed to political expediency—the Justices
feared that the Roosevelt administration would restructure the Court—revisionist scholars now con-
tend that the shift was foreshadowed by the Court’s earlier cases. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE
NEW DEAL COURT (1998).
65. During the late 1990s debate over poison-pill bylaws, for instance, Jeffrey Gordon and John
Coffee each suggested that structural issues are suitable for bylaws but ordinary business decisions
are not. Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted By-
laws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 547–49 (1997); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 605, 613–14 (1997). Proxy access bylaws clearly are structural. But see Hamermesh, supra
note 13, at 433–44 (questioning this and other rationales offered in support of poison-pill bylaws).
66. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008) (emphasis added).
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shifting unless the plaintiffs got everything they asked for.67 Yet the court
seemed much less concerned with the details of the bylaw and was more willing
to construe it charitably than with proxy access.
A more promising approach is to consider which corporate decision maker
proposed the bylaws, rather than (or in addition to) the bylaws’ content. Perhaps
the key difference is that directors—the proponents of the shareholder litigation
bylaws—have broader scope to adopt bylaws in Delaware than shareholders,
who are the advocates of proxy access. To be sure, this distinction does not
flow smoothly from the Delaware corporate law statute itself. The bylaw provi-
sion privileges shareholders, giving them an indefeasible right to adopt bylaws,
whereas directors do not have bylaw authority unless it is conferred on them by
their corporation’s charter.68 But Delaware corporate law explicitly states that the
corporation is managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.69 The
Delaware courts often point to this provision as justifying substantial deference
to directors’ decisions,70 and shareholder bylaws that alter the corporation’s gov-
ernance can be seen as undermining directorial oversight.71
According to this logic, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the proxy access
bylaw because it might interfere with directorial discretion to decide whether to
pay expenses. But directors were the ones who adopted the shareholder litigation
bylaws, and these bylaws did not interfere with the directors’ discretion. The
shareholder litigation bylaws were therefore less problematic.
This does, in fact, seem to be the reasoning underlying the cases. In CA, Inc.,
the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that “the DGCL has not allocated to
the board and the shareholders the identical, coextensive power to adopt,
amend and repeal the bylaws.”72 The key distinction lies in the fact that directors
are the ones given authority over the business and affairs of the corporation,
whereas “[n]o such broad management power is statutorily allocated to the
shareholders.”73 Because the proxy expense bylaw could prevent the directors
from exercising their fiduciary oversight, it was inconsistent with Delaware
law.74
67. If the plaintiffs claimed $50 million in damages, for instance, but only obtained $40 million,
they would be responsible for paying the defendants’ fees, despite the obvious success of the
litigation.
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2015). In practice, corporations routinely give bylaw authority to
the directors. I have not yet encountered a substantial Delaware firm that withheld this power from its
directors.
69. Id. § 141(a).
70. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
71. See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 13, at 431 (emphasizing section 141(a) as the key limitation
on shareholders’ bylaw authority).
72. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 2008).
73. Id. at 232.
74. Justice Jacobs was concerned that the bylaw would require reimbursement even if “the proxy
contest is motivated by personal or petty concerns,” despite the Delaware requirement that expenses
only be reimbursed in contests over substantive policy. Id. at 240.
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So far so good. One might quibble with the extent of Delaware’s solicitude for
directorial discretion75 and with the constraints this imposes on shareholders.
But the divergent decisions can be explained by a consistent principle.
When we turn to the Delaware legislature’s role in the drama, the underlying
doctrinal principle is not so readily apparent. If the lawmakers shared the Del-
aware judges’ concern for directorial discretion, they surely would have drafted
the new bylaw (and charter) provisions differently. When the legislature explic-
itly authorized proxy access and expense bylaws, for instance, it could have
included a proviso giving the directors authority to intervene in cases such as
the “personal or petty” proxy contest with which Justice Jacobs was concerned.
The legislature’s response to shareholder litigation bylaws is even harder to rec-
oncile with the logic of the Delaware cases. The ban on loser-pays bylaws and
restriction of forum selection bylaws have curbed directorial discretion, not pro-
tected it.
Perhaps the implicit assumption that I have been using so far—the assump-
tion that the Delaware courts and legislature are pursuing the same underlying
objective—is the wrong way to proceed. Although Delaware’s courts and legisla-
ture are closely linked, the legislature could have been pursuing a different doc-
trinal objective. The most obvious candidate is a perception that Delaware’s courts
went a little too far in their zeal to protect directorial discretion. According to this
reasoning, the Delaware legislature intervened to adjust the balance of authority
between directors and shareholders in a more shareholder-oriented direction.
This structural perspective is a much more plausible explanation for the leg-
islature’s handling of the two sets of bylaws. Shareholders’ most important cor-
porate law protections are voting rights and their position as the principal
beneficiaries of the directors’ fiduciary duties.76 The Delaware courts’ bylaw
decisions can be seen as eroding each of these protections. By calling proxy ac-
cess bylaws into question, the Delaware Supreme Court not only interfered with
an effort to make it easier for shareholders to contest directorial elections, but it
also signaled that the shareholders’ right to enact bylaws is subject to significant
limitations. Similarly, the court’s endorsement of fee-shifting bylaws threatened
to undermine shareholders’ ability to enforce directors’ fiduciary duties. Share-
holders and plaintiffs’ attorneys would be far more hesitant to bring fiduciary
75. Ironically, these decisions might have been influenced to some extent by the way that direc-
torial discretion emerged as a key factor in Delaware’s review of “dead hand” and “no hand” poison
pills, which were designed to prevent hostile bidders from removing a poison pill even after the bid-
der successfully replaced the current board of directors. Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180
(Del. Ch. 1998); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). When Delaware
struck down dead hand and no hand pills because they interfered with the discretion of future
boards, it was enhancing the power of shareholders vis-à-vis directors by removing an obstacle to
shareholder activism. With proxy access, by contrast, the emphasis on directorial discretion dimin-
ished shareholder power by striking down a provision that would have provided funding for success-
ful shareholder activism.
76. The next most important protection is appraisal rights—the right to insist that the corporation
buy the shareholders’ shares at a price set by the Delaware Chancery Court. Appraisal rights are gen-
erally limited to the merger context, however, and not all mergers at that. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)
(2015).
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duty litigation against directors if they faced the prospect of bearing both parties’
costs in the litigation.
The doctrinal picture that has emerged—which suggests that the Delaware courts
were concerned with protecting directorial discretion while Delaware lawmakers in-
tervened to limit the interference with the two key shareholder protections—does
seem to capture the broad contours of Delaware’s response to proxy access and
shareholder litigation bylaws. But it raises two very big sets of questions.
First is the question of timing: Why did Delaware lawmakers intervene so
quickly on each occasion, rather than waiting for the developments to play
out? The Delaware Supreme Court had not said that every proxy access bylaw
is invalid; rather, it raised doubts about a proxy expense bylaw that precluded
directors from withholding reimbursement if reimbursement would violate Del-
aware law.77 If the legislature had not intervened, perhaps shareholders would
have devised more carefully tailored bylaws, and these bylaws would have sur-
vived judicial scrutiny. Similarly, if the Delaware legislature had waited, the use
of shareholder litigation bylaws might have evolved in directions that did not in-
terfere with shareholder litigation. The leading advocates for directorial discre-
tion did not rush to embrace loser-pays bylaws, perhaps because they feared
the wrath of shareholder advisory groups.78 Perhaps loser-pays bylaws would
have remained a curiosity, used by unusual firms such as the men’s tennis
tour, but not by significant numbers of publicly held corporations.
Second, if Delaware lawmakers were concerned with protecting shareholders,
why did the protections take this particular form? In each instance, the legisla-
ture adopted narrow amendments that applied only to the issues in question—
proxy access and specific kinds of shareholder litigation bylaws.79 Odder still,
the legislature used a default rule with proxy access—a default rule that started
with a presumption of no access—whereas its new shareholder litigation amend-
ments imposed mandatory rules. It is not clear why default rules are appropriate
in one context, and mandatory provisions are appropriate in the other.
The doctrinal account I have developed in this part captures key features of
the oddly divergent responses of Delaware’s courts and its legislature to the re-
cent bylaw issues. But the doctrinal explanation is incomplete. To more fully un-
derstand the unusual recent developments in Delaware, we need to consider the
other imperatives that may have also shaped Delaware’s handling of the two sets
of bylaws.
77. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–40.
78. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the law firm best known for defending directors, counseled
its clients that “‘caution is in order’ because of court skepticism and likely the ‘vigorous’ opposition of
‘shareholder groups and proxy advisors.’” See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Ruling’s Chilling Effect on
Corporate Litigation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 23, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/05/23/a-rulings-chilling-effect-on-corporate-litigation/?_r=0 (quoting Wachtell, Lipton client
letter).
79. Moreover, the insistence that forum selection bylaws include a Delaware option also does not
appear to have been designed with shareholder protection in mind.
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III. DELAWARE’S POLITICAL IMPERATIVES
By the early 2000s, most corporate law scholars had concluded that state char-
ter competition is not much of a competition and that Delaware law tends to
strike a balance between the interests of its two main constituencies—managers
(and directors) and shareholders.80 Thus, charter competition is not really a race
either to the top or to the bottom; it is a race to somewhere in between.81 Del-
aware has won the race because no other state can seriously challenge it as the
premier state of incorporation.82
The past decade has made clearer than ever before that Delaware does face one
truly formidable competitor: the United States Congress.83 The more Congress
intrudes on state corporate law—the more issues are dictated by federal law—
the less Delaware incorporation has to offer. Delaware therefore has a strong in-
terest in keeping Congress at bay.
Scholars have long been aware that the Delaware courts have occasionally
handed down rulings that seemed intended to appease Congress. In 1977, Del-
aware tightened its scrutiny of mergers designed to cash out minority sharehold-
ers84 after critics complained that controlling shareholders were taking advan-
tage of temporarily deflated stock prices, a concern that featured prominently
in calls made by Ralph Nader and others for Congress to federalize corporate
law.85 After the Delaware Supreme Court imposed a new “business purpose” re-
quirement, the federalization ferment subsided.86 Astute Delaware watchers also
pointed to the Delaware Supreme Court’s Time-Warner decision87 as influenced
by developments in Congress.88 By 1989, when Time-Warner arose, the takeover
80. For a particularly nuanced version of this view, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2491 (2005) (analyzing Delaware’s interactions with Congress from the perspective of positive
political theory); id. at 2518–19 (describing managers’ and shareholders’ joint interest that key issues
be regulated by Delaware rather than Congress).
81. The foremost current advocates of the race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom views are Ro-
berta Romano and Lucian Bebchuk. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW (1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Compe-
tition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). The literature dates back to William Cary’s
articulation of the race-to-the-bottom view and Ralph Winter’s race-to-the-top response. William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977).
82. Indeed, the most noteworthy new contribution at the outset of the 2000s was Marcel Kahan
and Ehud Kamar’s work demonstrating that Delaware behaves like a monopolist in state corporate
law, charging supracompetitive prices through its franchise tax. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1.
83. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
84. Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
85. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 67, 79
(Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973).
86. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Fed-
eralism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 680 (2006) (discussing the perception that the new business
purpose test, as announced in Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), was intended to
quiet calls for federalization of corporate law).
87. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
88. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1971
(1991) (speculating that the Delaware Supreme Court may have been concerned about federal inter-
vention but developing a more general “socio-historical” account).
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wave of the 1980s was criticized by many as out of control, and calls for federal
intervention proliferated.89 Time-Warner deflated the outrage by shifting Dela-
ware doctrine in a noticeably pro-target direction, upholding the resistance
from Time Inc.’s directors to a lucrative hostile takeover bid by Paramount.
As real as the threats seemed at the time, they were distant and episodic com-
pared to the tensions between Delaware and Congress that have arisen in the
past decade and a half. After the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, Congress
federalized significant swaths of state corporate law with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which added numerous new provisions to the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.90 After the Great Recession of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act continued Con-
gress’s incursion into state corporate law. As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act
imposes a “say on pay” vote on compensation, requires banks to create an inde-
pendent risk committee, and explicitly authorizes the SEC to establish proxy
access.91
Delaware unveiled its proxy access bylaw rules in 2009, after the debates on
the proposals that gave rise to the Dodd-Frank Act had begun, but well before
the federal legislation took its final form.92 It is possible that that the Delaware
lawmaking process fit Delaware’s usual pattern of roughly balancing the interests
of managers and shareholders. Because shareholders were the strongest proxy
access advocates, even though managers opposed it, perhaps Delaware adopted
a compromise: Delaware law presumes that shareholders do not have proxy ac-
cess, in a nod to managers’ wishes. But if shareholder advocates persuade their
fellow shareholders to adopt a proxy access bylaw, proxy access can be adopted.
This explanation is consistent with the doctrinal explanation developed in the
last part.
There are several obvious flaws in this account, however. The first is that the
Delaware provisions actually secured very little for shareholders. An insurgent
shareholder who made use of the Delaware provisions would need to wage
two proxy contests—the first to secure the proxy access bylaws and the second
to take advantage of the bylaws. At the time Delaware enacted its proxy access
provisions, the shareholder was forced to bear the entire cost of the initial cam-
paign.93 From the insurgent’s perspective, it would be faster and might not be
enormously more expensive simply to wage an all-out proxy contest in the
first year, rather than embark on a two-year, two-stage campaign.94 Even if
89. See id.
90. For criticism, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG.,
Spring 2003, at 26, 31 (describing and critiquing the increased federalization of corporate law).
91. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
92. Senator Chuck Schumer had included proxy access in the “shareholder bill of rights” that he
proposed at the outset of the discussions that led to passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Shareholder Bill
of Rights Act, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
93. Since 2010, shareholders’ initial effort has been partially subsidized by the SEC’s revision of
Rule 14a-8, which no longer permits a corporation to exclude proxy access bylaw proposals from
its proxy materials.
94. Roe makes a similar point about the limitations of the Delaware provisions. Roe, supra note 31,
at 16–17.
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the new rules were more valuable to shareholders than I have suggested, it still is
not clear why the Delaware legislature was in such a rush to intervene. As noted
earlier, the Delaware Supreme Court had not outlawed proxy access altogether.95
The Delaware legislature might easily have waited to see whether a second gen-
eration of proxy access bylaws satisfied the court’s concerns. But it did not.
The haste of Delaware’s intervention suggests that Delaware was responding to
something else—the SEC and Congress. As Mark Roe has pointed out, Delaware
seems to have been trying to subtly preempt federal regulators and Congress by
establishing a framework for proxy access before Congress completed its work
on the Dodd-Frank Act.96 In a sense, Delaware may have been trying to signal
that there was no need to enact a federal proxy access provision, because Dela-
ware had already taken care of the problem.97 If the stratagem worked, Delaware
could repel a significant federal intrusion into state corporate law, and it could
determine the form that the new proxy access regime took.
The contrast between Delaware’s proxy access rules and their federal counter-
part is revealing in this regard. Any federal proxy access rule was likely to be
mandatory: publicly held corporations would be required to offer proxy access
to qualifying shareholders.98 By contrast, the Delaware framework did not pro-
vide for proxy access unless shareholders waged a successful campaign to enact a
proxy access bylaw. From this perspective, Delaware lawmakers’ decision to in-
tervene looked like an effort to ensure that proxy access took a less sweeping
form than federal regulators had in mind.99
In the short run, Delaware’s gambit seemed to have failed. Congress included
proxy access in the Dodd-Frank Act,100 despite Delaware having enacted a state
law version of proxy access. Promptly after Dodd-Frank, the SEC enacted a man-
datory proxy access rule.101 But the Delaware regime has governed proxy access
since the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule was struck down, and the SEC shows
no signs of revisiting proxy access and proposing a new proxy access rule.102
95. See supra note 77.
96. Roe, supra note 31, at 27.
97. As Delaware prepared to pass its proxy access provisions, one prominent Delaware lawyer
opined that “there isn’t much reason for the SEC to try to create a whole new proxy access scheme
that would preempt state law when state law had already provided for access.” Yin Wilczek, Proxy
Access: Schapiro Directs Staff to Draft Proxy Access Proposals, CORP. COUNS. WEEKLY, Mar. 11, 2009,
at 1, 2.
98. The rule that the SEC promulgated after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act was indeed
mandatory. For a description, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
99. In some respects, the short-lived SEC rule was more limited than the Delaware provisions. It
would have limited proxy access to shareholders that had held 3 percent of a corporation’s stock for
at least three years and would have required these shareholders to disavow any interest in control of
the corporation. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1347 (2011). The Delaware provisions allowed proxy access bylaws that omitted or reduced
these restrictions.
100. See supra note 8.
101. See supra note 35. For a skeptical assessment of the SEC’s proxy access rule, suggesting it
would have little practical effect, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 99.
102. One qualification: The D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable only struck down the SEC’s proxy
access rule (former Rule 14a-11), not new Rule 14a-8(i), which limits the corporation’s right to
exclude proxy access bylaws from its own proxy materials. As a result, shareholders’ initial campaign
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Given how well it explains Delaware’s 2009 proxy access reforms, the
preemption-of-SEC-and-Congress thesis is an obvious candidate for making
sense of Delaware’s equally rapid legislative intervention in 2015. According to
the preemption thesis, Delaware quickly intervened, lest Congress step in and fur-
ther federalize corporate law by enacting a new set of rules governing shareholder
litigation.
As with proxy access, preemption does seem to better explain Delaware’s 2015
bylaw reforms than a traditional account suggesting that Delaware was simply
balancing the interests of managers and shareholders, as it often does. One prob-
lem for the business-as-usual account is that the new shareholder litigation
bylaw rules do not look like a traditional compromise. To the contrary, they
look like a pure victory for shareholders at managers’ expense. Indeed, managers’
principal lobbying organizations mounted an energetic campaign to halt the Del-
aware legislation when it was first announced in 2015.103 Delaware’s haste to in-
tervene is similarly confounding for the business-as-usual account. Why inter-
vene so quickly, especially given the opposition from managers? Consider, by
way of contrast, Delaware’s response to other states’ enactment of antitakeover
legislation in the 1980s. In the face of support from managers of potential targets
and opposition from bidders and shareholders, Delaware dallied, finally enacting
a tepid antitakeover law long after other states had adopted more vigorous re-
strictions on takeovers.104
The rush to ban shareholder litigation bylaws is even more puzzling given the
dearth of evidence that these provisions would quickly become a standard fea-
ture of corporate charters and bylaws. Only forty-nine corporations (forty of
which were incorporated in Delaware) had adopted loser-pays bylaws or charter
provisions by the time Delaware banned them.105 Given managers’ hostility to
the ban and the newness of the issue, Delaware’s haste is hard to explain.
At first glance, the preemption-of-SEC-and-Congress thesis provides a much
more plausible explanation. Perhaps Delaware took immediate action lest Con-
gress intervene first. If we consider the actual posture of Congress in 2015, how-
ever, the likelihood of federal intervention seemed quite remote.106 In contrast to
2009, when federal lawmakers were actively debating the legislation that became
the Dodd-Frank Act, there was no obvious threat of federal legislation in 2015.
Shareholder litigation bylaws were not on anyone’s radar screen in Washington,
D.C. Moreover, even if some lawmakers had eagerly sought to assert federal
to adopt a proxy bylaw is now partially subsidized—because the company itself pays the cost of dis-
tributing the proxy materials.
103. See Pileggi, supra note 56 (describing opposition by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and cor-
porations such as DuPont).
104. Delaware section 203 does little other than require a supermajority vote for a second-stage
merger after an acquisition. For discussion of Delaware’s delay, see Romano, supra note 81.
105. According to one observer writing in early 2015, thirty-nine fee-shifting bylaws or certificate
provisions had been adopted. Claudia H. Allen, Fee-Shifting Bylaws: Where Are We Now?, CORP. L. &
ACCOUNTABILITY (BNA) REP., Jan. 16, 2015, at 2, 2–3. Bill Seidleck updated this information by check-
ing for additional fee-shifting terms up to the date Delaware banned loser-pays provisions (search
details on file with the author).
106. Jill Fisch has made a similar point. Fisch, supra note 15.
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authority over shareholder litigation, Congress does not seem likely to enact
business or financial legislation of any kind in the current political environment.
Finally, when Congress has gotten interested in these issues in the past several
decades, it has tended to tighten the rules of shareholder litigation, not to protect
plaintiffs’ attorneys and shareholders. In the 1990s, lawmakers twice enacted
laws that were intended to impose greater oversight of and tougher plead-
ing standards on plaintiffs’ attorneys.107 It is hard to imagine a Republican-
controlled Congress suddenly discovering a passion to intervene on plaintiffs’ at-
torneys’ behalf.
However, Congress is not the only federal threat to Delaware. The SEC and
other federal regulators can also encroach on Delaware’s authority. With loser-
pays bylaws and charter provisions in particular, there were hints that the
SEC might intervene and impose tighter regulatory scrutiny on corporations
that adopted loser-pays bylaws or included a loser-pays provision in their certifi-
cate of incorporation at the time of their IPO.108 But Delaware’s ban on loser-
pays bylaws and certificate provisions looks much less like an effort to outma-
neuver Washington than its handling of proxy access. If Delaware were trying
to implicitly preempt the SEC, it might have limited loser-pays provisions with-
out banning them altogether. Delaware could have permitted fee shifting only in
cases where the plaintiffs were entirely unsuccessful, for instance. But this is not
what Delaware did.
Delaware’s hasty intervention and complete ban of loser-pays provisions does
not seem to have been triggered by a concern to preempt Congress or federal
regulators. Yet these features suggest that Delaware lawmakers thought they
were reacting to a serious threat. What threat did they have in mind?
IV. THE CREDIBILITY CONUNDRUM
Neither the standard account nor the preemption-of-SEC-and-Congress thesis
fully explains why Delaware lawmakers decisively intervened in 2015. The law-
makers acted as if they faced a crisis, but their response seemed disproportionate
to the magnitude of the perceived crisis. In this part, I try to supply an answer
both to the general question of why Delaware lawmakers intervened and to the
narrower but more interesting question of why they stepped in so quickly.
The first thing to note is that Delaware needs cases; corporate law litigation is
the fuel that powers the mighty Delaware corporate law engine. Although Dela-
ware’s corporate law statute is well regarded, it could easily be replicated by
107. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
108. For a column by a leading corporate law scholar advocating SEC intervention, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Enforcement?, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY
BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-
it-still-believe-in-private-enforcement/. Coffee notes that the Carlyle Group dropped a mandatory ar-
bitration provision from its charter after criticism by regulators and investors, and he suggests that a
similar strategy could be used with loser-pays bylaws and charter provisions. Id. n.22.
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other states. What sets Delaware apart is its sophisticated corporate law judiciary
and its rich supply of precedents on any conceivable corporate law issue.109
Even Delaware’s critics acknowledge that Delaware’s judiciary is what makes
Delaware special.110 When a challenging new issue emerges in corporate law—
such as the question of whether target directors should be permitted to defend
against a takeover bid in the 1980s or the scope of permissible bylaws in the
1990s and 2000s—the key early case or cases are usually filed in Delaware,
and these cases enable Delaware’s judges to shape the emerging law.
Although Delaware is often the most obvious place for plaintiffs to file their
corporate complaints, it is almost never the only possible filing location, because
most Delaware corporations have their headquarters and principal place of busi-
ness elsewhere.111 If shareholders started filing their lawsuits in other states, the
Delaware engine would soon begin to struggle. Three decades ago, Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller pointed out some of the measures Delaware takes
to encourage litigants to file their cases in the state.112 For instance, Delaware
makes it very easy to obtain personal jurisdiction over the directors of Del-
aware corporations.113 The Delaware courts also are quite generous in awarding
attorney’s fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys who prevail in litigation.114
Despite these inducements, an increasing number of cases have been filed in
other jurisdictions since the early 2000s or have been filed by multiple plaintiffs
in multiple jurisdictions. In the most extensive study of this phenomenon thus
far, Armour, Black, and Cheffins found that 60 percent of all cases involving Del-
aware corporations were filed in Delaware until 2001, but this percentage
dropped below 40 percent from 2002 on.115 Many of these cases are challenges
to mergers.116 In the past few years, shareholder plaintiffs have challenged nearly
every substantial merger. Different plaintiffs file lawsuits in different states, and
the courts face the challenge of coordinating the lawsuits and ensuring that they
are resolved in a coherent fashion.
Exclusive forum clauses seemed to be an elegant solution to the multi-forum
litigation problem. If a firm’s directors adopted a bylaw or certificate provision
109. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 9, at 606 (“Delaware’s Chancery Court is thought to be an
important factor in Delaware’s dominance.”).
110. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 81, at 1471.
111. DuPont is (at least until the completion of its merger with Dow Chemical Company) one of
the few publicly held Delaware corporations that is headquartered in Delaware. Nearly all of Dela-
ware’s other corporations are headquartered elsewhere.
112. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corpo-
rate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
113. Id. at 512 (discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114, which was enacted immediately after
the Delaware statute authorizing the chancery court to compel the appearance of directors was de-
clared unconstitutional in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
114. Id. at 497 (pointing out that Delaware “awards attorney’s fees based on the relief obtained
rather than the number of hours reasonably expended” and that this is “widely believed, at least
in the Delaware bar, to be much more generous than the fees obtained through an hourly fee ‘lode-
star’ approach”); Armour et al., supra note 9, at 643 (same).
115. Armour et al., supra note 9, at 621.
116. See, e.g., Cain & Solomon, supra note 44, at 468 (describing merger litigation as the “dom-
inant form of corporation litigation”), 476 (documenting increase in multi-forum litigation).
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requiring that the parties bring any litigation in Delaware, the multi-forum liti-
gation problem would disappear. Shareholders would only file their lawsuits in
Delaware. It is perhaps not surprising that, when firms did not adopt these
clauses on their own, perhaps because of uncertainty as to whether they were
allowed under Delaware law, the Delaware Chancery Court signaled that the
clauses were likely to be permissible.117 Vice Chancellor Laster’s dicta prompted
numerous exclusive forum clauses, and the number increased still further after
the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to give its imprimatur.118
Delaware’s elegant solution had a potential dark side, however. The same doc-
trinal logic that justified Delaware forum clauses seemed to suggest that firms can
adopt other shareholder litigation clauses that do not bode quite so well for Del-
aware. Shortly after the Delaware Chancery Court explicitly upheld an exclusive
forum bylaw that specified Delaware as the forum, it was forced in another case
to address a Delaware corporation’s choice of North Carolina as its exclusive
forum.119 Next came the loser-pays bylaw, which is even worse from Delaware’s
perspective because it would seriously chill litigation and might be especially at-
tractive to corporate managers and directors.120 But the same logic that justified
bylaws selecting Delaware as the exclusive forum seemed to apply to the less-
welcome bylaws, and the Delaware courts duly upheld them.
From this perspective, the 2015 intervention looks like a simple midstream
correction. The Delaware courts had welcomed exclusive bylaws as a solution
to the multi-forum litigation problem, but the solution had itself become a prob-
lem. The Delaware legislature fixed the problem, preserving the beneficial fea-
tures of the new bylaws and removing their cancerous (for Delaware) attributes.
Although this explanation is plausible—in my view, it is compelling—we have
not yet answered the questions posed at the outset of Part IV. Why did Delaware
lawmakers feel the need to intervene rather than letting the Delaware courts con-
tinue to wrestle with the cases, at least initially? And why did the Delaware leg-
islature step in so quickly?
If we glance at the actual pattern of bylaw adoption, the mystery deepens. As
of August 2014, 93 percent of the exclusive forum provisions adopted by Dela-
ware firms specified Delaware as the exclusive forum, and there was no evidence
that this percentage was shifting.121 As noted earlier, forty-nine corporations
adopted a loser-pays bylaw or charter provision prior to the Delaware legisla-
ture’s intervention.122 Whatever threat Delaware faced does not appear to
have been imminent. Yet Delaware lawmakers took charge almost immediately.
Why the rush?
117. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
118. Romano & Sanga, supra note 47, at 29 (“Since the [Delaware Supreme Court] decision, exclu-
sive forum clauses adoption has grown at a constant linear rate of over 15 percentage points per year”).
119. Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.2d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014).
120. Cf. Macey & Miller, supra note 112, at 511 (arguing that Delaware’s failure to adopt a security
for expenses provision, which reduces derivative litigation, benefitted the Delaware bar at the expense
of Delaware managers).
121. Romano & Sanga, supra note 47, at 23.
122. See supra note 105.
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It is possible that the forty-nine loser-pays provisions were the front end of a
tidal wave and that these provisions soon would have become far more common.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys who challenged a draconian loser-pays bylaw
would risk being forced to bear both parties’ expenses if the challenge failed.
This risk might chill challenges.123 Yet one still would expect Delaware to
wait until it became clear that the threat was real rather than intervening so
quickly. It seems quite likely that the provisions would have been challenged,
despite the potential costs to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.
A more plausible explanation for the prompt intervention, and one that has
been credited by some Delaware watchers, is that it simply reflects successful
lobbying by Delaware trial lawyers, a key Delaware interest group.124 According
to this view, the leading plaintiffs’ lawyers convinced Delaware’s Corporation
Law Council to propose the reforms. The defense bar also stood to benefit
from the legislative intervention. By banning loser-pays clauses, the legislature
protected corporate litigation, and by forbidding non-Delaware exclusive
forum clauses, it increased the likelihood that the cases would be filed in Dela-
ware. The reforms benefitted Delaware’s corporate law bar more than any other
constituency, and Delaware lawyers seem to have actively promoted the reforms.
One of the most influential Delaware trial lawyers is an active member of the
Council,125 and another well-known Delaware plaintiffs’ lawyer recently wrote
a long article condemning the perverse effects of multi-forum litigation.126 Al-
though it would be unusual for Delaware plaintiffs’ attorneys to win such a de-
cisive legislative victory, they had several key advantages in this context. First,
although corporate managers opposed the 2015 changes, the harm to managers
was somewhat limited given that managers generally benefit from Delaware’s ex-
clusive forum provisions, and the managers of any corporation that adopted a
loser-pays provision could expect to face stiff criticism from shareholder advi-
sory services and other governance advocates.127 In addition, the interests of
Delaware’s corporate lawyers nicely align with Delaware’s own interests in this
context, because both benefit from cases being brought in Delaware rather
than elsewhere.128
123. John Coffee made a similar argument in testimony to the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee.
Testimony of Professor John C. Coffee Jr. Before the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Washington, D.C. 8 (Oct. 9, 2014) (stating that the “defendant’s expenses in a secu-
rities class action can easily exceed $10 million, and this amount would bankrupt many smaller
plaintiff’s law firms”).
124. Macey & Miller give a similar account of the Delaware sequestration statute that the U.S.
Supreme Court later struck down as unconstitutional, noting that several of the lawyers on the Del-
aware Corporate Law Revision Commission “‘freely admitted that they voted for retaining sequestra-
tion because it means more business for them.’” Macy & Miller, supra note 112, at 512.
125. Stuart Grant of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A.
126. Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes the Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements,
41 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2016).
127. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 78 (describing criticism of loser-pays bylaws by Institutional
Shareholder Services).
128. Similarly, if the managers of Delaware corporations responded to the ban on loser-pays pro-
visions by reincorporating in states that allow the provision, both Delaware itself and its corporate
lawyers would suffer.
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The principal limitation of the simple-interest-group explanation is that it
does not explain why Delaware lawmakers took such a dramatic step at a time
when victory in the battle against multi-forum litigation already seemed to be in
sight. Exclusive forum provisions selecting Delaware as the forum were steadily
increasing. Why not leave matters to the parties themselves and to the Delaware
courts? After all, Delaware judges benefit when cases are brought in Dela-
ware, just as Delaware trial lawyers and Delaware itself do. The distinctive pres-
tige of being a Delaware chancery court judge depends on Delaware’s status as
the preeminent state of incorporation.129 One might suspect that, over time, Del-
aware’s courts would interpret shareholder litigation bylaws and charter provi-
sions in a Delaware-friendly fashion.130 The judges might narrowly construe
the right to select a non-Delaware exclusive forum, for instance, or the scope
of permissible loser-pays bylaws.131
Although the judicial incentives that I have just described would appear to
make the 2015 legislative intervention unnecessary, they may also have had pre-
cisely the opposite effect. The apparent incentive of Delaware’s judges to discou-
rage the use of loser-pays and non-Delaware forum bylaws may have encouraged
Delaware’s lawmakers to step in. I do not mean to suggest that the influence of
the Delaware corporate law bar was irrelevant. It probably was quite important.
But another key factor, oddly enough, may have been the credibility of the Del-
aware judiciary. By credibility, I mean observers’ confidence that judges’ self-
interest is not distorting their decision making, and their general confidence
in the authority of the court.
To appreciate how judicial credibility comes into play, we need to briefly
consider the role that Delaware judges play in corporate law and the somewhat
awkward position they have found themselves in with recent shareholder
litigation.
The Delaware courts have long considered themselves to be the moral arbiters
of American corporate law.132 Not only do the Delaware courts determine ques-
129. Judge Posner has explored the role of prestige in judicial behavior in a variety of contexts.
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109–44 (1995); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maxi-
mize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); see also LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL
CHOICE (2013).
130. One risk, by contrast, is that non-Delaware judges would interpret the bylaws and charter
provisions in favor of their state, declining to enforce a Delaware-only bylaw when plaintiffs’ lawyers
brought the litigation in another state. Clear statutory authorization of Delaware-only bylaws and
charter provisions could reduce the risk that non-Delaware courts would subvert them.
131. One can perhaps see hints of this possibility in the First Citizens Bankshares case. The chan-
cery court emphasized that the First Citizens Bankshares dispute did not raise important and unre-
solved issues (“unprecedented claims”) that might induce the Delaware courts to hear the case despite
a non-Delaware exclusive forum provision. Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d
229, 240 (Del. Ch. 2014).
132. The classic article is Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). The term “moral arbiter” comes from David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997).
The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law 23
tions of liability in the most significant corporate law cases, but they also provide
instruction on best practices for the directors of publicly held corporations.133 In
its ruling on a shareholder challenge to Disney’s handling of its firing of a prom-
inent executive, for instance, the chancery court chastised Disney CEO Michael
Eisner for dominating the board and contrasted his behavior to acceptable board
practices.134
Delaware’s need to ensure it receives a steady stream of cases creates a tension
for Delaware judges. As I noted earlier, the reputation of Delaware’s judges is
linked to Delaware’s preeminence in corporate law.135 The most obvious way
to promote Delaware’s interests is to establish generous rules for compensating
attorneys without regularly imposing liability on managers and directors. But
this approach creates the risk that the Delaware judges will appear to be partic-
ipating in a form of implicit collusion. Providing a hospitable forum without in-
viting collusion would be tricky under any circumstances, but it is especially
sensitive given the Delaware judges’ role as moral arbiters in corporate law.
A decade ago, a law professor and a business school professor wrote an article
that raised somewhat similar concerns.136 They argued that after a freezeout
merger137 was announced, plaintiffs’ lawyers would immediately sue, alleging
that the directors had violated their fiduciary duties. Next, the directors repre-
senting the minority shareholders would negotiate a modestly higher merger
price and, as part of their final agreement with the controlling shareholder,
would propose to resolve the lawsuits filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys and give
the attorneys a hefty fee. The Delaware courts then routinely approved the
fees. The authors concluded that “the chancery court’s 100 percent approval
rate clearly provides no support for claims that the court is acting as an effective
monitor or is alert to the possibility of collusion.”138
The article did not suggest that Delaware judges were deliberately permitting
excessive fees, and the tendency to approve settlements with relatively limited
scrutiny is not unique to Delaware. But the article raised eyebrows, and the
freezeout cases continued to invite unseemly behavior, due in large part to the
doctrinal context in which they arose. Because the controlling shareholder in a
freezeout transaction has a conflict of interest, plaintiffs’ attorneys could assert
duty of loyalty claims, which are far more likely to succeed than duty of care
133. See id.
134. Although ultimately concluding that Eisner did not violate his duty to act in good faith,
Chancellor Chandler stated that “Eisner’s actions in connection with [Michael] Ovitz’s hiring should
not serve as a model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow. His lapses were many. To my
mind, [his] actions fall far short of what shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted
with a fiduciary position.” In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 762–63
(Del. Ch. 2005).
135. See supra note 129.
136. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law Mis(Shapes)
Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797 (2004).
137. In a freezeout merger, the directors of a company that owns a controlling stake in the target
corporation effect a merger that gives the minority shareholders cash for their shares in the target cor-
poration, leaving the controlling company with 100 percent of the target corporation’s stock.
138. Weiss & White, supra note 136, at 1845.
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allegations.139 As a result of the leverage this gave plaintiffs’ attorneys, the parties
allegedly developed their intricate freezeout dance, which led to generous fees
for plaintiffs’ attorneys and very little real benefit for the minority shareholders
that the attorneys were ostensibly protecting.
In the Cox Communications case, Delaware’s then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine
sharply criticized the pattern that had emerged in the freezeout cases.140
“[P]laintiffs and defendants both have an incentive to settle nonmeritorious, pre-
mature suits attacking negotiable, going-private proposals,” Strine wrote. “For
their part, plaintiffs’ lawyers can get sizable fees by ‘contributing’ to the success-
ful work of a special committee and by settling at the same level that the special
committee achieved.”141 Of the $4.95 million in attorney’s fees requested by the
plaintiffs’ attorneys, Vice Chancellor Strine awarded only $1.275 million.142 Cox
Communications was one of several early 2000s decisions sounding an alarm on
attorney’s fees,143 and it was part of an ultimately successful effort by the Dela-
ware Chancery Court to reshape Delaware doctrine in the freezeout cases.144
Ironically, the Delaware courts’ response to concerns about collusion may
have created—or, at the least, contributed to—the rise of multi-forum litigation.
Although there is considerable debate as to causes of the multi-forum trend,
some commentators suspect that Delaware’s newly tightened oversight of fees
prompted plaintiffs’ attorneys to consider other forums where courts might be
more flexible about fees.145
Many of the cases that are filed outside of Delaware seem to be brought pri-
marily for their holdup value.146 Losing these cases might not be especially prob-
lematic for Delaware. But Delaware also risks losing significant cases—the cases
that raise substantial issues and shape corporate law.
139. Controlling shareholders could avoid the rigorous freezeout scrutiny by conducting their
freezeout transaction in two steps. The controlling shareholder would make a tender offer for the mi-
nority shares to increase its ownership stake to at least 90 percent. The controlling shareholder could
then effect a short-form merger under section 253. Guhan Subramanian criticized the divergent treat-
ment of the two freezeout techniques in an influential article that appears to have contributed to the
doctrinal shift described in the text that follows. Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freeze-outs, 115 YALE
L.J. 2 (2005); see also Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory and Evidence, 36
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007) (finding that majority shareholders received significantly smaller premiums
in two-step transactions).
140. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005).
141. Id. at 605–06.
142. Id. at 648.
143. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 9, at 644 (describing shift starting in 2001).
144. In Cox Communications and In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 5377-VCL.
2010 WL 2291842 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010), the chancery court announced that it would provide
business judgment review to both types of freezeout transactions if the transaction is negotiated by
an effective special committee of the board of directors and conditioned on an affirmative vote of
a majority-of-the-minority shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court endorsed the unified standard
in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
145. Armour et al., supra note 9, at 644.
146. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 126; Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solo-
mon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015).
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If Delaware’s courts had adopted Delaware-friendly interpretations of share-
holder litigation clauses, the multi-forum litigation problem might have largely dis-
appeared with no need for legislative intervention.147 Indeed, a gradual restricting
of loser-pays and non-Delaware exclusive forum clauses might have been better
for Delaware in one very important respect: it might have diminished the risk
that Delaware’s hostility to these clauses—especially loser-pays provisions—
would prompt at least a few corporations to reincorporate in states that permit
the clauses, because gradual tightening would draw less attention to Delaware’s
hostility. But striking down these bylaws and charter provisions would raise ques-
tions about the credibility of Delaware judges. Even if the judge’s self-interest
played no role at all in her decision, critics might suspect that the judge’s analysis
was shaped by her own self-interest.148
Legislative intervention was an inspired alternative. The 2015 amendments
were patently self-interested—as Delaware-regarding as judicial invalidation of
loser-pays and non-Delaware forum bylaws would have been. But Delaware’s ob-
vious self-interest is less problematic for its legislature than for its courts.149 Not
only is Delaware’s judiciary more central to its preeminence in corporate law, but
state legislatures are expected to take state interests into account. Delaware’s leg-
islators are not the moral arbiters of corporate law; Delaware’s judges play that
role. By restricting shareholder litigation bylaws, Delaware lawmakers extracted
the Delaware judiciary from an awkward predicament while also furthering Del-
aware’s interest by ensuring that cases come to Delaware rather than elsewhere.
V. WHEN DOES THE DELAWARE LEGISLATURE INTERVENE?
The success of Delaware’s recent legislative intervention prompts one last
question: when are Delaware lawmakers likely to redirect the course of corporate
law? This question has received surprisingly little attention in the literature about
Delaware’s role in corporate law.150 I begin by speculating why this is—why do
scholars pay so much more attention to Delaware’s judges than to its legislature?
147. The Delaware courts might have concluded, for instance, that loser-pays bylaws impermis-
sibly insulate directors from judicial oversight by sharply reducing shareholders’ ability to bring fidu-
ciary duty litigation. They might have struck down most or all non-Delaware forum bylaws, reasoning
that Delaware judicial oversight is part of the package of provisions that a corporation accepts when it
incorporates in Delaware.
148. The dilemma is analogous in some respects to the position of an ostensibly independent di-
rector who has close, informal ties to the company she is overseeing. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
149. The Corporation Law Council’s defense of the shareholder litigation amendments seems to
reflect this intuition. In its effort to respond to criticisms that the legislation was “a protectionist
act intended to enrich the members of the Council and their firms,” the Council argued that “it is
the General Assembly, not the courts, that should evaluate whether, on public policy grounds, the
statute’s authorizing breadth should be narrowed.” Corporation Law Council, supra note 57, at 10.
150. The classic analyses of the Delaware legislature’s role are Romano, supra note 61, and Macey
& Miller, supra note 112. Neither focuses on legislative interventions that redirect Delaware corporate
law. The seminal analysis of the most famous earlier intervention, the Delaware legislature’s response
to Smith v. Van Gorkom, is Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155 (1990).
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I then try to discern rules of thumb about the Delaware legislature from its best-
known interventions.
One possible reason for the dearth of attention to Delaware’s legislature—or to
the relationship between the courts and the legislature—is the unusually close
links between the legislature and the courts.151 Most proposed corporate law
changes originate with the Corporation Law Council, a group of prominent cor-
porate lawyers and law professors who have close ties with the legislature and
with Delaware’s judges.152 Delaware lawmakers generally follow the Council’s
recommendations without making significant changes. Thus, it is easy to assume
that the legislature’s role is secondary.
A related reason for the apparent neglect is that headline interventions by the
Delaware legislature are quite uncommon. Although the legislature amends Del-
aware law nearly every year, the vast majority of these changes are clarifications
and minor adjustments. As noted earlier and discussed below, Delaware law-
makers rarely step in and dramatically redirect Delaware corporate law doctrine.
Indeed, the Delaware Constitution discourages lawmakers from suddenly alter-
ing Delaware law by requiring that changes to Delaware corporate law be ap-
proved by a supermajority (two-thirds) vote.153 This makes it difficult for law-
makers to secure controversial changes to Delaware corporate law.
What, then, are the exceptions? When do Delaware lawmakers shed their
usual reticence and affirmatively redirect Delaware law?
The most famous legislative intervention of the past generation—the enact-
ment of section 102(b)(7), which repudiated Smith v. Van Gorkom154—suggests
one rule of thumb. After the Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors of
Trans Union had violated their duty of care, despite obtaining a 40 percent pre-
mium for Trans Union’s shareholders, the market for directors’ and officers’ in-
surance temporarily collapsed.155 Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court cases
probably would have reassured corporate directors that Delaware was not in-
tending to dramatically toughen the duty of care and that Van Gorkom was an
outlier. But the Delaware Supreme Court cannot act quickly or unilaterally; it
has to wait for cases to come to it. The legislature was in a position to take action
much more quickly, and this is precisely what the legislature did. Less than a
year later, it enacted section 102(b)(7), which authorizes exculpation provisions
that insulate directors from duty of care liability.156 The Van Gorkom experience
151. Even Mark Roe, a particularly acute observer of Delaware institutions, treats Delaware’s leg-
islature and courts as more or less interchangeable. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 80 (including both
legislative and judicial changes as examples of Delaware’s responsiveness to Congress and federal
agencies); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 112, at 501–02 (describing influence of Delaware
bar with the legislature and an “intricate web of personal and professional contacts” that link the bar
and the judiciary).
152. A list of the twenty-two members of the Council can be found at http://www.dsba.org/
sections-committees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/.
153. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
154. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
155. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 150, at 1159–60 (describing Van Gorkom as one of the factors
that precipitated a crisis in the D&O market).
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
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suggests that the legislature may intervene when an immediate correction is
needed and the ordinary common law process is likely to be too slow.
The legislature’s authorization of proxy access bylaws may also have been
spurred by a need for haste. If the proxy access provisions were intended to pre-
empt Congress and the SEC, Delaware needed to signal quickly that it under-
stood the importance of proxy access. By early 2009, the legislative process
that led to the Dodd-Frank Act was already underway. Not only was the process
moving too quickly for Delaware to wait for an appropriate case to reach the Del-
aware Supreme Court, but it might well have taken even longer than usual for a
case to emerge, given that the Delaware Supreme Court’s disapproval of proxy
access bylaws strongly discouraged shareholders from proposing them.
In addition to speed, legislative intervention offers a related benefit as well: it
provides a clear, decisive signal that the rules have changed. To be sure, Dela-
ware courts also can clearly signal a shift in doctrine, and on occasion they
do.157 But the common law decision-making process lends itself most naturally
to a more subtle form of signaling. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
in the Time-Warner case was widely construed as a response to the growing per-
ception that the takeover wave of the 1980s had gone too far,158 and some sus-
pect that the Delaware courts’ handling of a high-profile case against the direc-
tors of Disney was influenced by public outrage at the corporate scandals of the
early 2000s.159 But in each instance, the court’s gestures were understated (and
with Disney, possibly imagined) and could easily be reconciled with Delaware
corporate law doctrine. A dramatic shift after Van Gorkom or on proxy access
would have been much more jarring. Far better for the Delaware legislature to
respond instead.
Neither of the first two rules of thumb—the need for quick intervention or for
a clear signal—seems nearly as relevant to the 2015 restrictions on shareholder
litigation bylaws. It was not obvious either that Delaware needed to act immedi-
ately or that a decisive signal was necessary. Here, the legislature’s intervention
seems best explained as motivated by other factors, including judicial credibility.
Indeed, even if concerns about judicial credibility did not directly influence the
decision-making process, the preservation of credibility is a crucial effect of the
legislative changes.
157. The classic illustration is Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), which repudi-
ated the “business purpose” requirement for freezeout mergers established by Singer v. Magnavox six
years earlier.
158. Gordon, supra note 88, at 1971–75 (developing socio-historical account of Time-Warner).
159. A challenge by Delaware shareholders to the $140 million severance payment Disney paid to
former executive Michael Ovitz led to procedural decisions (on the question of whether plaintiffs
should be required to make “demand” on the directors) by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2000
and by the chancery court on remand in 2003. Some suspected that the outrage over corporate mis-
behavior by Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s influenced the decision not to dismiss the case
on procedural grounds (the plaintiffs’ failure to make “demand” on the directors). By the time the
case went to trial in 2005, the outrage had diminished. After a colorful trial, the chancery court re-
jected the shareholders’ claims, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. For a succinct summary
of these developments, see WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 356–58 (4th ed. 2012).
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If I am correct about the importance of judicial credibility, this factor also may
help to explain the dearth of dramatic Delaware legislative interventions in the
past and to predict whether the legislature’s recent penchant for stepping in
will continue. Given the legislature’s response to the proxy access and share-
holder litigation controversies, Delaware might appear to have entered a new pe-
riod of frequent legislative intervention. But this seems unlikely. If Delaware law-
makers regularly intervened, the interventions would both directly and indirectly
undermine Delaware’s courts: directly, because lawmakers are, in effect, chastis-
ing the court for its handling of the issue in question; indirectly, because regular
intervention would suggest that the Delaware case law is provisional rather than
authoritative. Indeed, the most important decision would be the least credible,
because these would be the decisions most likely to be revised by the legislature.
Notice the delicate balance Delaware’s legislature seems to have struck in 2015.
When the legislature overrules Delaware’s courts, the intervention is likely to un-
dercut the credibility of the judiciary, because it reflects disapproval of a ruling
or rulings. Yet with shareholder litigation bylaws and charter provisions, any
short-term damage was considerably outweighed by the long-term benefits of re-
moving the issues from the courts. Legislative intervention inoculated the judi-
ciary against the risk that far more serious reputational harm might have oc-
curred if the courts had continued to decide exclusive forum and loser-pays
bylaw cases. But the strategy only works if the Delaware legislature uses it
sparingly.
Perhaps there will be another dramatic intervention by the Delaware legisla-
ture in the next year or two. But the vulnerability of the Delaware judiciary’s rep-
utation, and its centrality to Delaware’s corporate law eminence, suggest that
Delaware lawmakers’ interventions on proxy access and shareholder litigation
bylaws are likely to be the last dramatic gestures we see from the legislature
for a while.
CONCLUSION
Delaware is in an awkward position as the preeminent state of corporation. It
is dominant yet vulnerable. Delaware’s recent vulnerability stems from the real-
ities that Congress can federalize key corporate issues at any time and that Del-
aware’s success depends on a delicate compromise in which Delaware makes
sure that plaintiffs’ lawyers get paid while also giving significant protection for
managers.
The genius of the Delaware legislature’s dramatic interventions—first to per-
mit proxy access bylaws and now to restrict shareholder litigation bylaws—is
that while the interventions were nakedly self-protective, they may leave Dela-
ware better off than it was before the start of the 2000s while also protecting
the credibility of the Delaware courts. If there is a logical answer to the puzzle
of Delaware’s handling of the two recent bylaw controversies, I suspect this is
where it lies.
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